Given their scale, and the sheer diversity of their participants, the European Union’s parliamentary elections can only be compared to the Indian elections for being a truly impressive feat of democracy. In an era of democratic backsliding, the EU deserves credit for how it integrates such a diverse range of interests.
While the voters get to pick from familiar national parties – and often vote based on national-level concerns and grievances – these parties join one of seven alliances at the European level; meaning that a diverse range of interests are distilled and aggregated into a handful of broadly coherent voices.
The unfamiliar proportional representation voting system, distant institutions, as well as the focus on policy consensus over adversarial personalities, unfortunately made the EU an easy target for populists like Nigel Farage. But I would argue that these are more symptomatic of the system’s stability and fairness of representation than a serious democratic deficit.
Politics of consensus
It’s true that the EU system forces coalitions to be built behind closed doors, out of voters’ direct control. But every effective system of representative government will see this to some extent, it’s just a matter of whether these are the alliances of convenience within ‘big tent’ political parties, as we have in the UK (such as the competing factions in the Tories); or between several smaller parties.
Accountability of incumbent parties is less visible and absolute than the UK is used to, but this avoids the whiplash-inducing policy swerves that we have become all too familiar with. It is also notable that ten member states were communist dictatorships just 35 years ago but are now participating as vibrant pluralistic democracies.
The Greens: victims of their own success?
As was predicted, the biggest losers of the elections were liberals and greens, while the biggest winners have been conservatives and populists. This has in turn been variously described as an anti-green backlash, or a rising tide of right-wing populism. And indeed, these underlying trends cannot not be diminished or overlooked by the new commission. We are likely to see a significant slow-down or even retrenchment to the parliament’s hitherto impressive wave of much-needed green legislation.
The European Green Deal includes not only requirements to cut emissions, but tough new deforestation due diligence rules, “right to repair” legislation and a ground-breaking nature restoration law. Some political scientists say that the electorate serve as a thermostat: in that case, the greens are victim of their own policy successes.
Twenty-seven different elections
The results are an aggregation of many national-level trends. The post-Ukraine invasion economic downturn has driven discontent and dissatisfaction with most EU governments. And for voters, immediate material concerns have taken precedence over supposedly high-minded environmental motivations. Most notably, parties in Germany’s centre-left, green and liberal coalition have taken the brunt for the country’s long-term dependence on Russian gas. More broadly, economic malaise saw many relatively moderate incumbent parties, from Olaf Scholz’s SPD to Emmanuel Macron’s Ensemble, suffer heavy losses; and far right parties, excluded from government and therefore responsibility, were the beneficiaries.
But the backlash against the left was not universal, with Poland’s national conservative Law and Justice party and Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz losing seats to more moderate parties. While seats won by Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy received attention, these came entirely at the expense of right-wing populist League. In contrast, gains made by Italy’s left-wing bloc (led by progressive feminist Elly Schlein), went less noticed. Meanwhile left-wing parties performed well across the Nordic countries, which currently have relatively right-wing governments. In short, as with almost any ‘midterm’ election, the most common theme has been a backlash against national incumbent governments.
What next?
So, while the relative trend to the right has undeniably been unwelcome for greens and progressives, the election results do not represent an irreversible or unstoppable tide to the right. The incumbent ‘grand coalition’ of the centre-right European People’s Party, centre-left Socialists and Democrats and liberal Renew Europe retained its majority and has a good chance of being re-instated. Although, depending on how effectively the radical right can re-organise itself, some concessions may be made to Meloni and her national conservative allies.
But broadly, the EU’s grand coalition has a chance to show that it is democratic and responsive to people’s concerns, by making broadly green and liberal policies work for everyone. Given its strong democratic institutions, it has as good a chance of doing this as any other government. But without relenting in the fight against climate-change, the commission must show that its policies are not designed to attack the farmers or motorists themselves. If the new parliament wants to succeed, it must rethink who has to pay for, and who gets to profit from, the green transition. If it does not, the world’s second largest democratic system risks losing not only its legitimacy, but the climate fight itself.
