Before the night of Sunday 12 April was over, Viktor Orbán, who had ruled Hungary for sixteen years as the leader of Fidesz, had already conceded the election, such was the finality of the projections pouring in. That day, the Hungarian people elected his opponent, Péter Magyar, a former loyalist of Orbán who broke away to form his own party, Tisza, in 2024. Magyar’s landslide victory, in which his party obtained a critical two-thirds majority, has sparked an abundance of commentary. In a recent post, four Cambridge researchers with academic and personal ties to Hungary penned their own thoughts on the election and its implications.
Orbán’s 16-year rule
As Professor Nora Berend, a Hungarian-born professor of European History at St Catharine’s College, writes, few people believed that Orbán could lose. Not only because “all government polling institutes – unlike independent organisations – predicted a Fidesz victory”, but because over the course of Orbán’s 16-year rule, he had systematically undermined the independence of state institutions by packing them with loyalists, and had rigged the electoral, judicial, media and political systems in his favour. Constitutional court judges, state media officials and the prosecutor general were all cronies of Orbán.
On foreign policy, Orbán’s tenure was “characterised by a gradual rapprochement with Vladimir Putin and other authoritarian leaders”, writes Elvira Viktória Tamus, a Hungarian PhD researcher in the Faculty of History at Sidney Sussex College. He consistently attracted criticism from the EU, especially in recent years in relation to the Russia–Ukraine war.
At the start of Orbán’s tenure, writes Dr Marietta van der Tol, a senior postdoctoral researcher at Trinity College, his party “rewrote the constitution and passed laws that cemented its power”. The party utilised a two-thirds supermajority in Hungary’s unicameral legislature to pass “cardinal” laws that required the same two-thirds majority to repeal and at the same time, changed electoral law to make if difficult for opposition movements to ever gain a two-thirds majority. All of which makes Tisza’s emphatic victory even more impressive and significant.
Deciphering election results and storylines
Around 80% of eligible voters cast their vote in last week’s election, making it the “largest mandate in the history of post-socialist Hungary”, notes Elvira Tamus. According to the latest count, Tisza’s total of 141 parliamentary seats, out of a total of 199, constitutes a record, too. To obtain such a majority, Tisza had to win in rural constituencies, places with “older, less urbanised populations” that Fidesz had traditionally relied on as strongholds, writes Tamus. This electoral script was flipped. In addition to Budapest and other urban strongholds, Tisza won in many small towns and villages, vindicating Magyar’s wide-reaching campaign in which he visited around 700 settlements. It is a particularly symbolic turn of events given how reliant poor countryside residents had been on the Fidesz government’s favour for basic goods, notes Marietta van Der Tol.
Barnabás Szabó, a Hungarian post-doctoral researcher at the Centre for Geopolitics at Peterhouse, writes that campaign tactics used by Fidesz in previous elections – “a combination of relatively satisfactory economic performance, targeted fiscal measures and an aggressive and overpowering communications strategy” – had worn thin with voters. For Elvira Tamus, the result shows to what extent Hungarians were infuriated with rampant corruption, stagnation and inflation, as well as “anti-Ukraine and anti-Western rhetoric”.
Global reverberations
The amount of coverage this election received in the international press shows just how significant the result is. Its (geo)political, ideological and social ramifications will be felt in not only Hungary, but in all corners of the world.
For Nora Berend, the upshot is simple: Hungary chose “Europe instead of Russia”. Barnabás Szabó strikes an equally conclusive tone: “Hungary’s place is in Europe – always has been and always will be”. Most expect Peter Magyar’s new leadership to steer Hungary towards a more amicable relationship with the EU and NATO, thus moving away from Russia and the subversion of EU support for Ukraine.
Ideologically, Nora Berend writes, such a resounding defeat for “the poster-boy of anti-European illiberal democracy and nationalist populism has rattled the followers of the Orbán model”, many of whom endorsed him during the campaign.
Domestic implications – what’s next for Hungary?
Change must begin domestically, however. Of central importance here is the two-thirds majority that will allow Magyar to change laws, amend the constitution and oust Fidesz loyalists; “the means to enact regime change”, summarises Nora Berend.
Hungary needs to undergo a thorough process of “de-Fideszisation”, continues Berend. Magyar has already called for the President, a Fidesz loyalist, and the directors of numerous institutions to resign. These Orbán loyalists, who control so many Hungarian levers of power, have a lot to lose. Will they opt to cooperate pragmatically with the incoming government or obstruct reform?
Dr Barnabás Szabó reasons, though, that while Tisza’s supermajority will enable it to act with fewer constitutional constraints, its ability to implement sweeping change in Hungary is uncertain. “Hungary may once again become a more reliable partner to its allies, yet its contribution to collective defence will be limited by years of mismanagement and corruption affecting the armed forces”, writes Szabó. “The legacies of the past decade – economic, institutional, and social – will shape both the opportunities available to Péter Magyar and the constraints his government will need to navigate.”
The election is the start that Hungary needed, but structural change “is not a moment, it is a process, and it will take time to deliver it”, writes Marietta van Der Tol. As Magyar moves to address corruption, reduce energy-dependence on Russia and rebuild institutions, Hungarians will be hoping for material improvements at the ground level, “especially the schools and hospitals, where the failure of the state has been felt so acutely.”
Elvira Tamus writes that some commentators have voiced concern about Tisza’s two-thirds majority, pointing out that it was precisely this tool that Fidesz used to consolidate its power and erode democracy. Others note that there is no left-wing representation in parliament, a first in recent years, while three right-wing parties have a presence.
Ultimately, though, as Nora Berend writes, “Orbán’s defeat … is cause for joy for all democrats.”
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