What do people expect from a Labour government? Few people pay much attention to manifestos or election pledges, but there are some underlying expectations of political parties. Labour is expected to defend the rights of working people, to reduce inequality and to improve public services. And, despite promises, it will raise taxes to pay for these things.
This is probably what most people who voted Labour in 2024 hoped for. But a recent paper by David Klemperer at the University of Bath, suggests that voters are moving beyond ‘deliverism’ to a more visceral politics, where change matters less than stories.
What have they delivered?
The present government has a decent case that it has lived up to expectations. It has undertaken major legislation to give new rights to workers. It has taken 450,000 children out of poverty and introduced a host of small measures like breakfast clubs and limits on the cost of school uniforms to reduce pressure on the poorest, and it has protected the state pension. It is nationalising the railways and is reforming the energy and water industries. It has capped bus fares and embarked on a programme to reform the NHS.
Yet despite this, this government is unpopular at unprecedented levels. Keir Starmer’s poll ratings are the worst for any prime minister ever. Remarkably for such a self-effacing figure, the pollster Luke Tryl reports that in focus groups people often say they ‘hate’ Keir Starmer, though they can rarely explain why.
There have been obvious mistakes: an inheritance tax reform aimed at the very rich, which caught popular – and not very rich – farmers; and welfare reforms which had not been well-prepared for. Some of the blame can be attributed to Labour’s old enemy, a hostile print media.
And people had perhaps unrealistic expectations. After 14 years of static living standards, people hoped for rapid change, but major change takes time.
A crisis of delivery
So, what is going on? A recent substack article by David Klemperer from Bath University argues that the problem is a ‘crisis of delivery’. ‘Deliverism’ argues that voters reward governments that improve the economy and build policies that create loyal supporters.
This was the approach of the Biden government. The American Rescue Plan, the Inflation Reduction Act and Child Tax Credits raised jobs, wages and green investment. But, despite this, Biden remained unpopular, and Democrats lost the 2024 election. Many commentators asked why these programmes bought so little political benefit. The link between good policy and electoral reward seemed to have broken down.
Some claim that politics follows shared perceptions and online narratives more than people’s direct experience. Despite Biden’s strong performance on jobs and wages, voters had already decided against Biden, and were discounting those achievements. They were looking for reasons to reject him, and they focused on inflation, the failure to entrench new welfare entitlements and real cost‑of‑living problems.
Labour’s mixed approach
The Starmer government is following the same deliverist model, stressing making change that people can experience. And the party’s own communications emphasise that Labour is “delivering change”.
But, if people have lost faith in delivery and are increasingly preferring emotional “connection” over delivery, this no longer works. Unlike Polanski or Farage, Starmer does not ‘connect’ well, at least in public media appearances.
So, people’s frame has been set: they are no longer attending to what he is delivering, especially when it seems to affect other people. And this enables people already hostile, to attack him from two contradictory directions: both that he is obsessed with technocratic delivery and metrics, and that he focuses on public relations and chasing the polls.
The local and the national
Inevitably, people’s sense of the state of the nation is shaped less by their own experiences than by the information environment. In general people are much more positive about their own lives and locality, which they experience daily, than about the country as a whole, which they can only know about from the media – often hostile newspapers, right‑wing TV channels and social media filled with misleading or extreme content. And for commercial reasons online platform algorithms tend to amplify anger and sensationalism.
Economic stagnation and rising inequality driven by neoliberalism have produced a broad sense of unhappiness. Without confidence in the ability of government to improve things, people seek cultural affirmation or emotional release rather than unattainable material benefits.
And the problem is exacerbated by generational factors. The proportion of “post‑economic” voters, especially older people who own property and have secure assets, is rising. Shielded from job‑market shocks and more likely to vote, they care less about growth and unemployment and more about identity.
Delivery still matters
However, Klemperer argues that the anti‑deliverist battle is not lost. There is still strong evidence that what governments do affects how people see them, and that economic and social conditions can shape election results. In the UK, dissatisfaction clearly reflects austerity, Brexit and the handling of Covid. However, the link between delivery and political reward has become weaker and more complicated. Delivery is necessary, but it is no longer sufficient.
The centre‑left now needs to do two things at once: deliver material improvements and operate skilfully in the current media and political environment so that these improvements are visible, salient and emotionally meaningful. That means being clearer about what will be delivered, who to prioritise and what policies are hardest for inflation or hostile narratives to erode. But they need stronger stories and emotional appeal.
Parties need new approaches to social media communication, organisation both online and offline, more visible ways of implementing policy and stronger regulation to reshape media systems.
Klemperer argues that there are two “post‑deliverist” tendencies within this government. One is a deregulatory, growth‑first, media‑savvy “insurgent government” approach associated with the Labour Growth Group. The other is a place‑based, co‑operative “Pride in Place” approach that seeks to rebuild trust through tangible local change and shared decision‑making.
Neither offers a complete answer, but both might contribute to moving beyond simple deliverism in a tougher, more mediated political age.











