Most people have stopped talking about Brexit, but the local election results suggest that the political identities which emerged from the referendum have become deeply embedded. The places that voted most strongly for Leave also voted most strongly for Reform, while Remain areas voted strongly for Greens, Liberal Democrats and Labour. But this is no longer (if it ever was) about Europe.
In a new book, Tribal Politics: How Brexit Divided Britain, Sara Hobolt and James Tilley have explored this and its implications for our future politics.
From opinion to identity
When people vote in an election, they ‘buy’ a bundle of issues from a party. Some they like, some they are prepared to tolerate. And they also know that they will get a chance to change their minds in four or five years’ time if they don’t like the result.
But the Brexit referendum was different. It was a yes/no decision on a single issue, with an outcome that would be permanent, with little chance to ever change your mind. So, people knew the issue was more consequential.
Before 2016, most people did not think much about the EU, and their views were often soft or vague. Europe was just one policy issue among many, and not even high up that list. But the simple, forced choice turned Leave and Remain from lightly held opinions into social identities.
Social identity theory helps explain this. Humans like to belong to groups. They quickly distinguish between ‘us’ and ‘them’, and then interpret events in ways that favour their own side. Historically, that is how party loyalty has shaped not just how people vote, but how they judge governments and rival parties. Hobolt and Tilley argue that similar processes began to operate around Leave and Remain.
Once people had chosen a side, many began to see themselves as Leavers or Remainers in the same way they used to see themselves as Labour or Conservative. Hobolt and Tilley argue that this is not a simple reframing of the old left v right distinctions, but a new political divide. They describe this as a “creation event”: a new dividing line which rivals, and perhaps replaces, party loyalty.
Economy and motivated reasoning
The authors take attitudes to the economy as a case study. Before the referendum, most people had broadly similar views of economic conditions. But immediately after the result, pessimism among disappointed Remain voters rose sharply and stayed high. And while Leave voters did not suddenly become very optimistic, they did keep their earlier, more positive view. This is “motivated reasoning”: once people have picked a side, they tend to notice and believe information that makes their choice look right.
Since the referendum, the economy has performed badly. Both groups accept that things are going wrong. But they disagree about the causes. While Remainers blame Brexit and believe that leaving the EU has made problems worse, Leavers point to outside shocks such as immigration, wars or foreign leaders. In this way, the same facts are filtered through different identity‑based lenses.
Both feel threatened by change since the 2008 global economic collapse. People for whom things seemed to be (slowly) getting better, and had voted Remain for the status quo, now see their quality of life threatened by political chaos. People whose prospects had stagnated for a decade, and who had voted Leave for radical change are now disappointed that their lives have not improved. Viewing the world through their different lenses, they both double down on their identity.
Social media, friends and echo chambers
Social media has played some part in this polarisation, but the book suggests a more nuanced picture. Although highly political, one‑sided, online spaces do make some users more extreme and more hostile to the other side, relatively few people follow politics on social media. On the other hand, people care deeply about fitting in with those close to them – family, friends, and neighbours. Conversation in these circles often reinforces existing beliefs. The tribe coheres, even if people are not actively seeking political content online.
However, social media has an indirect influence. First, the minority who live in echo chambers includes many ‘opinion formers’, such as journalists, politicians, campaigners and academics, whose amplified voices shape what others see and hear. Second, younger people are turning away from traditional news and getting more of their information from online platforms. There, self‑selection and algorithms can draw them into intense debates around specific issues such as climate change or foreign policy. And these issues tend to cluster round the new identities. So, for example, hostility to net zero has become part of the Brexit identity, although there is no immediate European issue.
How long will these tribes last?
The book’s data shows that Brexit identities became much stronger immediately after the referendum. Since then, their intensity has fallen somewhat. But the tribes it created survive, although most will no longer associate this with Europe. And for many people, they have replaced the traditional Conservative/Labour ones.
The local election results demonstrate this very clearly. The divide between Reform and progressive voting areas directly mirrors the Leave/Remain one. People have adopted new identities. Leavers voted Reform, and Remainers voted Green or Liberal Democrat.
The two traditional main parties both tried to avoid inflaming the division by sitting on the fence over Europe. And the voters abandoned them both.
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